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Abstract 
As per January - August 2013, the Government of Indonesia (GOA) has regulated a quota-based import restriction policy for 
importing shallot. This policy has produced an effect to the shallot price that rose significantly in spite inflation occurred. In 
order to control the inflation rate, on 2 September 2013 the government changed the import restriction policy, from quota based 
into price reference based as stated in a decree of the Director General of Domestic Trade No.118/PDN/KEP/10/2013.The price 
reference of shallot was counted at IDR 25,700/kg, and discounted at IDR 11,935/kg at the farmer level. The aim of this research 
is to determine the price reference of shallot import restriction that suit for protection of farmer profit of shallot farming. The 
method of analysis used in this research is Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM). The results shows that the implementation of price 
reference policy with the price at IDR 11,935/kg at farmer level has decreased the farmer protection and profitability for 46 % 
and 233 %, respectively. This decreasing was caused by the price reference of shallot at the retailer level. It is discussed that the 
price reference of shallot should be increased at least to IDR 15,260/kg at the farmers level to achieve a higher rate of protection 
and profit that would be most beneficial to farmers. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Jurusan Teknologi Industri Pertanian, Fakultas Teknologi Pertanian, Universitas Gadjah 
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1. Introduction  
Importing shallot used to be taken by Government of Indonesia (GOI) to fill the shortage of national shallot yield. 
However, to protect the shallot farmers from the impact of importing policy, GOI has been applying two principal 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +62-8525-8800-109 
E-mail address:moch.wahyudin@yahoo.com 
 20     lsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by- c-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Jurusan Teknologi Industri Pertanian, Fakultas Teknologi Pertanian, 
Universitas Gadjah Mada
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
133 Moh. Wahyudin et al. /  Agriculture and Agricultural Science Procedia  3 ( 2015 )  132 – 136 
policy instruments, i.e. trade restrictions and tax incentives or subsidies. Suppose that the government is expecting to 
let the local price of shallot above the importing price then it can be achieved either through restricting import, or 
levy a tax on both production domestic and import. Alternatively, if the government wants the domestic price lower 
than importing one, the only policy is to apply incentive for importing shallot.  
As per January - August 2013, the Government of Indonesia (GOA) has regulated a quota-based import 
restriction policy for importing shallot as stated in Regulation of Minister of Agriculture (PERMENTAN) No. 
60/PERMENTAN/OT.140/9/2012. This policy has produced an effect to the shallot price that raised significantly 
that trigger inflation. In order to control the inflation rate, on 2 September 2013 the Government has changed the 
import restriction policy, from quota based into price reference based as stated in Regulation of Minister of 
Agriculture (PERMENTAN) No.86/PERMENTAN/OT.140/8/2013.  
According to a decree of the Director General of Domestic Trade No.118/PDN/KEP/10/2013, the price reference 
of shallot was counted at IDR 25,700/kg. The price reference was obtained from price of shallot at farmer level, 
added cost of distribution, depreciation, transportation, loading, profit at the retailer level, and coefficient of prices 
diversity. The price of shallot at farmer’s level estimated at IDR11,935/kg, it is obtained from production costs at 
IDR 8,525/kg and 40% profit at level farmer. 
Determination of price reference was opposed by Dewan Bawang Merah Nasional (DEBNAS), National Council 
of Shallot. According to them, the price reference of shallot should be counted at IDR 25,700/kg, hence discounted 
at IDR 11,935/kg at the farmer level, was considerably too cheap. It would disadvantage shallot farmers. Concerning 
that when the shallot price is high, it will escalate the price of farming input especially seeds and pesticides. 
However, when the shallot price is decreasing, the price of seeds and pesticides are insensitive to adjust. This is the 
conditions that bring a loss to farmers. Here, this study aiming to determine the price reference of shallot that suit for 
protection of farmer income. 
2. Methods 
The method used in the analysis is Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM). It begins with the calculation of existing 
levels of private (actual market) and social (efficiency) revenues, costs, and profits shallot trading. This calculation 
reveals the extent to which actual profits are generated by policy transfers rather than by underlying economic 
efficiency, (Monke dan Pearson, 1995).  
Table 1. Policy Analysis Matrix 
  
Revenues Costs Profits 
Tradable Inputs Non-tradable Inputs 
Private  A B C D 
Social  E F G H 
Divergences I J K L 
                 Notes: private profits (D) = A-B-C; social profits (H) = E-F-G; output transfers (I) = A-E;  
                           input transfers (J) = B-F; factor transfers (K) = C-G; net transfers (L) = D-H = I-J-K. 
The term of private refers to observed revenues and costs reflecting actual market prices received or paid by 
farmers, merchants, or processors in the agricultural system. The private, or actual, market prices thus incorporate 
the underlying economic costs and valuations plus the effects of all policies and market failures. The second row of 
the accounting matrix utilizes social prices. These valuations measure comparative advantage or efficiency in the 
agricultural commodity system. The appropriate social valuations are given by world prices, CIF import prices for 
goods or services that are imported or FoB export prices. 
The steps of PAM method is: (1) identifying the revenues and cost structure; (2) estimating the actual revenues 
and cost; (3) estimating the social revenues and cost; and (4) analyzing the effect of policies on protection and 
profitability of farmer. The research was conducted at Probolinggo, East Java Province, Indonesia. Samples were 
collected using purposive sampling technique. Respondent are those with an area more than 1 hectare and have been 
farming shallots prior and after the implementation of the import restriction regulation. 
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3. Result and Discussion 
The Policy Analysis Matrix is a product of two accounting identities, one defining profitability as the difference 
between revenues and cost and the other measuring the effects of divergences (distorting, policies and market 
failure) as the difference between observed parameters and parameters that would exist if the divergences were 
removed. By filling in the element of the PAM for an agricultural system, an analyst can measure both the extent of 
transfer occasioned by the set of policies acting on the system and the inherent economic efficiency of the system.    
The calculated of private (actual market) and social (efficiency) revenues, costs, and profits of the shallot farm  -
before and after the implementation of the import restriction policy- is presented in the table 2 and table 3. 
Table 2. The revenues and costs of shallot farming before policy 
  
Revenues Cost of Inputs Profits 
Tradable Non-tradable 
Private (Actual) 75,916,845.70 29,825,072.20 22,508,488.28 23,583,285.22 
Social (Shadow) 46,450,624.51  17,947,962.28  22,026,481.78 6,476,180.45 
Divergences 29,466,221.19  11,877,109.92  482,006.50  17,107,104.77  
Table 3. The revenues and costs of shallot farming after policy 
  
Revenues Cost of Inputs Profits 
Tradable Non-tradable 
Private (Actual) 87,596,191.41 40,966,820.27 22,394,536.73 23,930,001.61 
Social (Shadow) 26,890,006.22 26,890,006.22 21,888,639.43 18,229,134.70 
Divergences 20,588,411.06 14,076,814.05 505,897.30 5,700,866.91 
Measures of divergences can include the effects of efficient and distorting policies and of market failures. It is 
useful to know how much of the difference between private and social valuations is attributable to each parameter. If 
market failures are unimportant, these transfers measure mainly the effects of distorting policy. It can be argued that 
if the system is efficient then it will earn excess profits without any intervention needed such as from the 
government. In contrast, the availability of provision (subsidies) policy causes the escalation of profit.  
The tradable-input transfers are defined as the difference between the total costs of the tradable inputs valued in 
private prices and the total costs of the same inputs measured in social prices. The value of input transfers, as 
demonstrated on figure 1, while the implementation of price reference policy has increased farming cost up to 19 % 
at IDR 2,119,704/ha which more expensive than prior the policy implemented as measured at the same farming 
season. This escalation was caused by the increasing of the seed price significantly at the time the price reference 
policy regulated. The seed price prior amount at IDR 14,640.63/kg and after the policy being regulated it increased 
about 124 % at IDR 32,812.50/kg. This means that farmers relatively should pay IDR 32,812.50/kg higher than 
social (shadow) price. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Value of Input Transfers and Output Transfers, before and after policy 
 
An output transfer is defined as the difference between the actual market price of commodity and the price 
according to the efficiency valuation. Suppose the system has more than one output, a private output price above its 
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social price means that policy is providing a positive transfer, causing the production system to realize higher private 
profits or cover greater private costs than it could be without the influence of the policy. This positive transfer has a 
positive sign in the third row of the PAM, as demonstrated in Table 2 and Table 3. The value of Output Transfers, as 
demonstrated in figure 1, since the price reference policy has been regulated, it decreased 30 % lower or at a yield 
IDR 8,887.810/ha harvesting shallot. This yield is cheaper or means that the given price of shallot is cheaper than if 
the policy is not imposed. 
These separate influences of commodity pricing policies can be combined into an indicator namely 
Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC). The EPC is the ratio of the difference between revenues and tradable-input 
costs in private prices against in social prices. In PAM notation, EPC is the ratio of added value as obtained in 
private prices and world prices. The ratio thus shows how much the policies induce added value which could be 
differ from what it would be in the absence of such policies. EPC is an indicator of the net incentive or disincentive 
effect of all policies affecting prices of tradable outputs and inputs. For the value of EPC greater than 1 means that 
private profits are higher than they would be without commodity policies, and vice versa.  
The effect of policies on farming income can be analyzed through the value of Profitability Coefficient 
(PC). The Profitability Coefficient (PC) is a measure of the degree to which net transfers have caused private profits 
to exceed social profits. The PC extends the effective protection coefficient to include factor transfers. An EPC 
greater than 1 (PC>1) means that the policy provides incentives to producers, and vice versa. The complete value of 
EPC and PC is as shown on figure 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Ratio of EPC and PC, before and after policy 
As demonstrated on figure 2, it can be argued that the net impact of government policy on price reference 
influencing product markets. The output price and tradable input price allows the shallot trade system to have added 
value in private prices 62% greater than without policy transfers (as measured in world prices). When the price 
reference policy regulated, the value of EPC is 1.16 points. This cause added value in private prices 16% greater. 
However this increasing is lower than prior the regulation take place. While the implementation of price reference 
policy has reduced value to 0.46 points of the EPC ratio means that the policy reduces 46% of farm protection.  
Beside, PC value before and after the price reference policy regulated is 3.64 points and 1.31 points. This means 
that the policy did not work accordingly as shown that prior the policy the private price able to reach 3.64 times 
greater than social profits or 264 % greater. The transfer policy of the price reference has permitted private profits 
1.31 times greater than social profits, or 31 % greater. While in contrast, the policy has reduced value of PC to 2.33 
points. 
It can be concluded that the price reference policy has an impact on protection and profitability of shallot farmer. 
Based on result, for achieving higher rate of farmer protection and profitability it should be considered to 
reformulate the import restriction policy, and the price of shallot at the farmers level should be at least IDR 
15,260/kg. 
4. Conclusion  
The implementation of import restriction on price reference basis policy has an impact to the shallot farmers’ 
income. The policy suggests that the price at farmer level is IDR 11,935/kg which decreased the farmer protection 
and profitability for 46 % and 233 %, respectively. This decrease was caused by the escalation cost of farming 
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inputs and the lower added valued. It is then proposed that the price reference of shallot should be at least IDR 
15,260/kg at the farmer level to achieve a higher rate of protection and revenue that would be most beneficial to 
farmers.  
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